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ISSUE FOR THIS BRIEF 
Whether damage arising from an exercise of the police power 
is ever compensable and, if so, under what circumstances. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-3, U.C.A. 
1953, states in relevant part: 
The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of 
flood and storm systems by governmental entities are con-
sidered to be governmental functions, and governmental en-
tities and their officers and employees are immune from suit 
for any injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
2. Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Section 63-30-10(1), states 
in relevant part: "Immunity from suit of all governmental en-
tities is waived * * * except * * * (b) * * * [for] civil rights 
[claims]." 
3. Great Salt Lake Causeway Act (H.B. 30, 1984 Utah Laws, Ch. 
32) is reproduced in Appendix A of Colman's original brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State's principal Statement is in the Brief of State 
Respondents (hereinafter State's "Primary Brief11) at 2-6. 
The level of the Great Salt Lake has fluctuated drastically 
over its recorded history. R. 133, pp. 3-10. When the railroad 
Causeway was completed in 1959, the Lake was in a down-trend. 
Id. at 4. M[B]y 1963 it had reached an all-time historic low of 
4,191.35 feet [elevation above sea level].11 Id. at 7. 
By 1967, when an earlier lessee began constructing the ditch 
(R. 494), the Lake was at 4194.35 on the north side of the Cause-
1 
way. R. 133, p. 4. (The ditch was constructed on the state-
owned lakebed about 1700 feet (one-third of a mile) north of the 
Causeway. R. 547.) 
By July 1984, the Lake was engulfed in an unprecedented 
rise. It already had flooded hundreds of additional square 
miles1 of private and public property, public facilities, and 
transportation routes. R. 164. And the Lake continued to rise. 
By this time, pursuant to the Great Salt Lake Causeway Act, work 
was in progress to breach the Causeway. 
Appellant Colman's Complaint was filed July 20, 1984. R. 2. 
It alleged the breach of the Causeway would damage part of his 
ditch located on the lakebed. He prayed for an injunction to 
stop the breach and, in the alternative, for damages. R. 2-13. 
On July 30, 1984, Judge Jay Banks conducted an evidentiary 
hearing on Colman's motion for preliminary injunction. By agree-
ment, the parties1 evidence was submitted in advance, by means of 
litigation affidavits. R. 488-489; 40-43; 204-207; 110-115; 194-
203; 172-179; 163-169; 187-193. The parties also supplemented 
the affidavits by means of live testimony, which was transcribed. 
R. 485, 490. On July 31, 1984, Judge Banks announced his deci-
sion denying the motion for preliminary injunction. R. 572. The 
Causeway was breached August 1, 1984. 
On February 10, 1986, Judge Banks heard arguments on the 
Respondents1 respective motions to dismiss. He granted those 
1
 To illustrate the vast acreage being newly flooded by the 
rising Lake, the rise from September 1982 to July 1983 (when the 
Lake reached "only" 4205) flooded an additional 267 square miles. 
R. 133, p. 3. Of course, much more land was flooded by July 
1984, when the Lake was over 4209. R. 134. 
2 
motions on May 2, 1986, after "having reviewed the entire file," 
R. 461, which included the evidence adduced on the motion for 
preliminary injunction. Colman appealed the district court's 
Order and Judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 7, 1989. 
By letter dated March 9, 1989, the Chief Justice requested this 
Supplemental Brief. 
Judge Banks decided as a matter of law that Colman has no 
cause of action, because of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
the State's police power, the Great Salt Lake Causeway Act, and 
the State's public-trust authority. R. 462. He also concluded 
that "there otherwise has been no compensable taking of a proper-
ty interest," and that Colman1s Complaint "otherwise fails to 
state a cause of action." R. 462. 
Judge Banks' decision is well supported by the record.2 
z
 Colman now does not want us to refer to the record deve-
loped in the trial court and referred to by Judge Banks. But 
this Court is free to consider the record; indeed, we respect-
fully submit that this competent evidence (some of which is 
uncontradicted) must not be ignored. 
There is no virtue in rigid adherence to a technical rule 
that has no practical bearing on the proper outcome of a parti-
cular case. For example, as a practical matter it is immaterial 
that Judge Banks did not expressly treat this case as one for 
summary judgment under Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P. He did not make 
specific findings of fact, but before dismissing Colman's Com-
plaint he "reviewed the entire file," which includes the record 
evidence. R. 4 61. Besides, uncontradicted evidence speaks for 
itself; no purpose would have been served by specific findings on 
- those facts. Rule 56(e). At least as to the uncontradicted 
facts against his claim, Colman cannot avoid defeat by "the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading." Rule 56(e). 
Our situation compares to one in which, after a plaintiff 
presents his case at trial, a motion to dismiss is granted "on 
the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
(continued...) 
3 
2(...continued) 
shown no right to relief,lf Rule 41(b), U.R.Civ.P. 
The hearing in the trial court was fair, and Colman had 
every opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he felt necessary. 
He certainly was not surprised by the State's evidence (e.cr. , 
that before the breach Colman had no ditch in the area opposite 
the breach-site), for the parties exchanged affidavits well 
before the hearing. R. 488-89. 
Nevertheless, Colman now argues that the record cannot be 
used in this case because "[a]t the preliminary injunction 
hearing, the court specifically stated that it was ruling on 
whether the plaintiff met his burden of proof for a preliminary 
injunction and that the ruling was not dispositive of the other 
issues raised." Colman's Supp. Brief 4 n.6. Colman confuses 
the point. 
When Judge Banks decided against the injunction, he could 
not decide the motions to dismiss, because those motions had not 
yet been filed (they were filed 20 days after the breach occur-
red) . Besides, the evidence in the record was the same at and 
after the hearing. The evidence adduced in the injunction hear-
ing had not changed, and the court could consider it in reaching 
a final disposition on the merits of the case. Colman's burden 
of persuasion in the injunction hearing is irrelevant, for the 
question here is the availability of the evidence itself, not the 
burden. (In any event, one of Judge Banks1 tasks in the injunc-
tion hearing was to judge the merits of Colman's case; i.e., to 
weigh its likelihood of success on the merits.) 
There is no reason to spend more time and judicial resources 
on another evidentiary hearing. The law is clear, as are several 
decisive, uncontradicted facts. Judge Banks properly could rely 
on the record. And whether or not he decided this case partly on 
the evidence or solely on the pleadings, this Court is free to 
consider the record before it, and may affirm the trial court for 
being correct as a matter of law, regardless of how the trial 
court reached its decision. This Court "may affirm a trial 
court's decision on proper grounds even though different than 
those relied upon by the trial court." Branch v. Western Petro-
leum Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982). This Court will choose 
from among "alternate bas[es] for decision," to "affirm a trial 
court's decision whenever we can do so on a proper ground." Bill 
Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const., 677 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 
1984); also see Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 
892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
Of course, the decision below can be affirmed without 
reference to the record evidence. The law, applied to the 
(continued...) 
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Indeed, certain decisive facts are uncontradicted. For 
example, Colman admitted he has no water right3 (i.e., no right 
to divert water (the brines) from the Lake). R. 501. Colman had 
not dredged his ditch in the area for years. R. 495. And 
Colmanfs witness, Clark Lin, agreed the ditch could have eroded 
away in the months and years before the breach, as the Lake's 
water arose around and against the ditch. R. 515. In fact, 
eight days before the breach, the only examination of the "ditch" 
showed that in the area opposite the breach-site there was no 
ditch.4 R. 114. That area was in water 10 feet deep. R. 113. 
2(...continued) 
pleadings standing alone, shows that there was no "taking" and 
that no compensation is required. (Colman!s allegation of a 
"taking" is a legal conclusion entitled to no deference.) 
3
 Colmanfs application to appropriate water lapsed for lack 
of proof of appropriation; he had never yet achieved a perfected 
water right. His approved application simply permitted him to 
"appropriate" (divert and put to beneficial use) the water. Once 
he had successfully made the appropriation and filed proof of the 
appropriation, he would have been entitled to a certificate from 
the State Engineer, evidencing his perfected water right. But he 
has filed no proof that he ever appropriated any water under his 
application. (Of course, without a water right, he cannot 
extract brines from the Lake, and in that case the ditch has no 
function or value to him.) 
4
 The only evidence from immediately before the breach 
showed that the remnant of the ditch at its most defined point 
had a maximum "conduit capacity" of only 3.2 feet (1.5 feet below 
the natural lakebottom plus a berm of 1.7 feet). R. 112-13. 
That location was closer to shore than is the area opposite the 
breach site. In the area "immediately north of and in line with 
the breach site * * * the berm [was] completely eroded away and 
the ditch silted in, and for all intents and purposes [the ditch 
was] unusable as a brine conduit." R. 114. 
That is uncontradicted record evidence. While he now 
complains about our use of the record (see our note 2), Colman 
incongruously (and improperly) makes allegations to this Court 
that are not in the record. Those allegations (Colman1s Supp. 
Brief 3 at n.4) should be seen for what they are, the self-
(continued...) 
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Moreover, whatever rights Colman has in the "ditch" depend 
on the terms of the 1978 lease between Colman and the State. 
On Colman's motion, the Court admitted into evidence both 
the lease (Exhibit IP) and the Land Board's 1979 approval (Ex-
hibit 2P) of Colman's request to add the "ditch" (which someone 
else had constructed in 1967) to the lease. R. 489, 494. By 
that 1979 Board action, the ditch became part of, and governed 
by, the lease. R. 489. The lease requires Colman to pay an 
annual rental of 50-cents per acre. Lease article III(a). 
In the lease, Colman made certain agreements that bear on 
this case. For example, Colman understood and agreed that the 
lease expressly reserved to the State "[t]he right to permit for 
joint or several use such easements or rights of way upon, 
through, or in the land hereby leased as may be necessary or 
appropriate to the development of these or any other lands 
belonging to or administered by the Lessor [State]." Article IV 
(emphasis added)(Exhibit IP, p.2). 
He further agreed that "Neither party shall be liable to the 
other for any loss or damage suffered or incurred * * * by reason 
or as a result of * * * acts of God or the public enemy * * * 
[or] floods * * *." Article XIV (Exhibit IP, p.4). 
And Colman acknowledged that the "lease is granted subject 
to the laws of the State of Utah," including future regulations. 
Article I (Exhibit IP, p.2). 
4(...continued) 
serving product of Colman's remarks to his counsel "[f]ollowing 
oral argument." His comments cannot withstand the record. 
6 
As the record shows, breaching the Causeway was the best way 
to give "immediate relief on any emergency basis from the wide-
spread flooding caused by the rising waters of the South Arm of 
the Lake." R. 128. And the Legislature did breach the Causeway. 
R. 373-375 (Great Salt Lake Causeway Act).5 
"On appeal, Colman does not claim that the Causeway Act was 
an arbitrary act or that the breach was an improper use of police 
power." Colman's Supp. Brief 13 n.ll. 
I SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's authority or power is fully comprehended in its 
revenue powers, eminent domain powers, and police power. (The 
police power is everything not included in the revenue and 
eminent domain powers.) 
To answer the Court's question: No, an exercise of the 
police power does not require compensation for any damage it 
causes. Only an exercise of eminent domain requires compensa-
tion. If a plaintiff wants compensation for an alleged "taking," 
he can prevail against the State only if his case comes within 
and qualifies under the law of eminent domain. 
A plaintiff can maintain a claim for compensation under the 
law of eminent domain only by meeting each of these four con-
ditions: (1) He must have the right to bring suit against the 
State for this type of claim; (2) his compensation claim must be 
b
 See also U.S. District Judge Aldon Anderson's discussion 
that the causeway-breach-project was a valid exercise of the 
State's police power. Great Salt Lake Minerals v. Marsh and 
State of Utah, 596 F.Supp. 548, 557-58 (D.Utah 1984), excerpted 
in State's Primary Brief at 29-30 n.16. 
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for the loss of a real, cognizable, protectable property right; 
(3) there must be a "taking" as a matter of law; and (4) there 
must be a "taking" as a matter of fact. 
The plaintiff's first obstacle, condition 1, is sovereign 
immunity. Conditions 2, 3 and 4 go to the merits of the plain-
tiff's case. (Each of these latter three requirements must be 
met or else the plaintiff's case ipso facto falls outside the 
realm of eminent domain and within the noncompensable realm of 
police powers.) 
Colman's claim under Article I, Section 22, is barred by the 
State's sovereign immunity. Similarly, his Fifth Amendment claim 
is barred as a matter of the State's immunity under federal law. 
If Colman could overcome the State's immunity, his takings 
claim would still fail because he has no real, cognizable, 
protectable property right. There was no property right to 
"take." His lack of "property" in this case results from the 
terms of the lease between Colman and the State, and also from 
the Public Trust Doctrine. 
Even if he had a cognizable property right, he can state no 
"takings" claim in this case as a matter of law. 
He has no right to compensation because he cannot show that 
the State acted outside the realm of noncompensable police power; 
he cannot prove that breaching the Causeway was an act of eminent 
domain. 
The Causeway was breached in response to a public emergency, 
and by law this exercise of emergency police power does not 
require the State to compensate Colman. 
8 
A separate body of law clearly shows that government effects 
a "taking" in flood situations only if the flooding actually and 
permanently invades the property so as to constitute an appropri-
ation of, and not merely an injury to, the property. This body 
of "flooding" law represents another reason to conclude that 
Colmanfs "ditch" was not "taken." 
The law relating respectively to emergencies and flooding 
clearly controls this case. On those bases alone, Colmanfs claim 
should be rejected. 
Two other areas of "takings" jurisprudence (concerning 
physical interference, invasion or occupation of property; and 
regulation of property), are not directly relevant to this case, 
and do not help Colman, anyway. 
We note also that, in the so-called "Salt Cases," this Court 
has recognized the importance of the State's right to manage and 
control its own Lake for the public good; and conflicting rights 
should not be allowed to diminish or fetter the State's control. 
Because of sovereign immunity, the nonexistence of a cog-
nizable property right, and the lack of legal merit of Colmanfs 
claim, there is no reason to reach the question of whether the 
"ditch" was taken as a matter of fact. (The record shows that 
the facts will not support Colman's "takings" claim in any 
event.) 
Clear law and sound public policy require the conclusion 
that Colman has not had any property "taken." The Causeway 
breach was a valid, noncompensable exercise of the State's police 
power. 
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ARGUMENT 
The Court asks: When, if ever, does an exercise of the 
police power require compensation. 
A. 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLICE POWER AND EMINENT DOMAIN 
We must first define some terms. "In [one] sense, the 
police power is but another name for the power of government." 
Mutual Loan Company v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 233 (1911). In 
other words, the police power is the basis or authority for 
everything the State does or may do. It is an expansive, com-
prehensive power. Id. at 232-34. 
The police power is "to promote the public convenience or 
the general prosperity * * * [and] the public health, the public 
morals, or the public safety." Id. at 232, quoting Chicago, B. & 
Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906). It "is not 
confined 'to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly, or 
unsanitary,1 but 'extends to so dealing with the conditions which 
exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare 
of its people.1" Martell, 222 U.S. at 232-33, quoting Bacon v. 
Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 318 (1907). 
The police power "is not subject to any definite limita-
tions, but is coextensive with necessities of the particular 
situation and safeguard of the public interest." Ward v. State, 
188 Ga.App. 372, 373 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1988). 
All of the government's many powers (the comprehensive 
police powers) divide into three distinct categories: (a) 
revenue powers, (b) eminent domain powers, and (c) all other 
10 
police powers. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 513-14, 78 P.2d 920, 
925 (1938). 
In this more specific sense (i.e., category (c) just above), 
"police power" is defined by its contradistinction to eminent 
domain. That is, as used hereinafter, "police power" is all 
governmental power except eminent domain powers.6 
Eminent domain is the sovereign power to take property for 
public use without the owner's consent. 1 Nichols1 Law of 
Eminent Domain (3rd ed. 1973, as updated 1988)(hereinafter 
"Nichols Eminent Domain"), Sec. 1.1, p. 1-7. Under Article I, 
Section 22, of the Utah Constitution,7 and the Fifth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution,8 just compensation must be 
paid for an exercise of eminent domain. 
In contrast, by its nature and definition and by longstand-
ing force of law, an exercise of police power does not require 
compensation. 1 Nichols Eminent Domain, Sec. 1.42[3], p. 1-248. 
See also id., Sec. 1.42, p. 1-145 ("an interference with the use 
of property as the result of a sovereign act, other than one of 
eminent domain, does not amount to a compensable taking");9 Lewis 
6
 We exclude the revenue powers from this analysis because 
they obviously are not involved here. 
7
 "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation." 
8 n* * *
 n o r shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." 
9
 The police power is "one of the most essential powers of 
government, one that is least limitable. It may, indeed, seem 
harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the 
imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation 
upon it when not exerted arbitrarily." Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 
(continued...) 
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v, DeKalb County, 251 Ga. 100, 303 S.E.2d 112, 115 (1983) (the 
Constitutional provisions requiring compensation for taking 
private property "have no relevance to the exercise of the police 
power")10; McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 6 Utah2d 92, 305 P.2d 
1097 (1957) . 
If a plaintiff wants compensation for an alleged "taking," 
he can prevail only if his case comes within and qualifies under 
the law of eminent domain (which encompasses inverse condemna-
tion) . As between an exercise of police power and an exercise of 
eminent domain, only the latter requires compensation. 
Therefore, the answer to the Court's question is: No, an 
9(...continued) 
239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915). 
"[T]he police power, although it may take property, does 
not, as a general rule, appropriate it to another use, but de-
stroys the property, while by eminent domain property is taken 
from the owner and transferred to a public agency to be enjoyed 
by the latter as its own." An exercise of the police power does 
not entitle the property owner "to any compensation for any in-
jury which he may sustain, for the law considers that either the 
injury is damnum absque injuria or the owner is sufficiently com-
pensated by sharing in the general benefits resulting from the 
exercise of the police power." 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, sec. 
6, p. 179. 
"Constitutional provisions against the taking of private 
property for public use without just compensation impose no 
barrier to the proper exercise of the police power." Id. at 180. 
Note that, "[o]n appeal, Colman does not claim that the 
Causeway Act was an arbitrary act or that the breach was an 
improper use of police power." Colmanfs Supp. Brief 13 n.ll 
(emphasis added). Colman nevertheless demands compensation. Id. 
1 0
 Also see Nichols Eminent Domain, Sec. 1.42[3], p. 1-252, 
and cases cited therein. 
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exercise of the police power does not require compensation for 
any damage it causes.11 
We will now address the circumstances that do require the 
State to pay compensation (i.e., the circumstances that qualify 
for compensation under the law of eminent domain). 
B. 
FOUR CONDITIONS FOR COMPENSATION 
Four criteria determine whether a particular situation 
qualifies for compensation under eminent domain. A plaintiff 
must meet each of these criteria or conditions in order to 
maintain a claim for compensation: 
1. He must have the right to bring suit against the State 
for this type of claim; 
2. His compensation claim must be for the loss of a real, 
cognizable, protectable property right; 
3. There must be a "taking" as a matter of law; and 
4. There must be a "taking" as a matter of fact. 
The first condition concerns sovereign immunity, which is 
the plaintiff's first obstacle. Conditions 2, 3 and 4 go to the 
merits of the plaintiff's case: If he fails to prove his case on 
each of these latter three requirements, then he has failed to 
bring his case within the realm of eminent domain and, ipso 
11
 Of course, so far we have only drawn a definitional line 
of demarcation between the police power and eminent domain. The 
precedents and principles that place a given case on one side of 
the line or the other are discussed below. It is necessarily 
true, in any event, that a plaintiff can require compensation by 
a "takings" claim only if he proves a "taking" under the law of 
eminent domain. That is the test. 
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facto, he has proved that his case belongs in the noncompensable 
realm of police powers. 
In sum, a plaintiff can require compensation for an alleged 
"taking" only if his case meets each of the four requirements. 
1. Sovereign Immunity 
a. 
Policy Reasons For Immunity. Colman's suit is barred by the 
State's immunity. (See State's Primary Brief at 8-15.) Fair-
dough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah2d 417, 354 P.2d 105, 106 
(1960); Holt v. State Road Comm'n, 30 Utah2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286, 
1288 (1973). To some, sovereign immunity may seem a harsh 
principle. In fact, though, it underlies effective government. 
It "protect[s] the state from interference with the perform-
ance of its governmental functions." Hopkins v. State, 237 Kan. 
601, 702 P.2d 311, 317 (1985). Government and its officials 
"require this protection to shield them from undue interference 
with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of 
liability." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). 
For "it cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently 
run against the innocent as well as the guilty—at a cost not 
only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole." 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. 
"These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the 
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the 
deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office." 
Id.; also see Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660-61 (Va. 
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1984); Hurst v, Highway Dept., 16 Utah2d 153, 397 P.2d 71, 72-3 
(1964). 
"Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will 
•dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most 
irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of 
their duties.1" Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (citation omitted). To 
diminish immunity "would contribute not to principled and fear-
less decision-making but to intimidation." Wood v. Strickland, 
420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975), quoting Pierson v. Rayf 386 U.S. 547, 
554 (1967). Judicial immunity has similar justification. Stump 
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
Without immunity, the State and its officers might be less 
willing or able to make or implement difficult decisions and 
thereby "perform [their] duties." Wood, 420 U.S. at 321. 
Immunity is necessary partly because the State might make 
mistakes. "The concept of immunity assumes this fi.e., that 
government may err] and goes on to assume that it is better to 
risk some error and possible injury from such an error than not 
to decide or act at all." Id., quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 
U.S. 232, 242 (1974). 
Far from being outmoded, sovereign immunity is as vital to 
effective government now as when Fairclough and related cases 
were decided. Those decisions are correct and necessary. 
b. 
Utah Law Provides Immunity. Fairclough held that the 
eminent domain provision (Article I, Section 22) of the Utah 
Constitution "is not self-executing, nor does it give consent" 
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for suits against the State. 354 P.2d at 106. One may sue the 
State under that provision only by clear legislative consent. 
And by its terms Article I, Section 22, concerns only 
property rights; sovereign immunity does not violate the Con-
stitution, partly because any opportunity to sue the State is "a 
privilege accorded," not a "property right." Fairclough, 354 
P.2d at 106-107, quoting Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 
581 (1934). 
Note that Faircloucrh states three separate reasons to uphold 
sovereign immunity: (1) The Utah Constitution's eminent domain 
provision is not "self-executing, [2] nor does it give consent to 
be sued"; and (3) sovereign immunity does not violate any consti-
tutional property right. 354 P.2d at 106-107. The Court quotes 
Lynch on this third reason. 
Lynch involved a contract between the Government and the 
plaintiffs. The Court noted that a contractor's rights under a 
government contract are property rights "protected by the Fifth 
Amendment," although nevertheless subject to the police power. 
292 U.S. at 579. (The police power was not an issue, however. 
Id. at 580.) 
1 2
 The holding in Fairclough, that no claim (even a con-
stitutional claim) can be maintained against the State without 
legislative waiver of immunity, accords with Utah Constitution 
Article VIII, Section 3 (Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction "to 
be exercised as provided by statute"), and Section 5 (district 
courts have original jurisdiction "in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute"; all other courts' 
jurisdiction "shall be provided by statute"). Sovereign immunity 
is in "the nature of a jurisdictional bar," Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974), and the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
expressly preserves immunity here. 
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In Lynch, the United States had successfully demurred in the 
trial court "on the ground that the court was without jurisdic-
tion * * * because the consent of the United States to be sued 
had been withdrawn" by a particular act of Congress. Id. at 575. 
On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed the act withdrawing the waiver 
of immunity had "deprived them of property" in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. Id. 
The Supreme Court decided, as a matter of statutory con-
struction, that the act had not actually withdrawn the waiver of 
immunity. Id. at 575, 583, 585-87. The Government's immunity 
therefore remained waived. 
But the Court clearly reaffirmed that the Government could 
have reestablished its immunity "at any time." Id. at 581. "The 
rule that the United States may not be sued without its consent 
is all-embracing." Id. Immunity—and even its reestablishment 
after its waiver—does not violate the Fifth Amendment. Id. The 
reason is as stated above: "[C]onsent to sue the United States 
is a privilege accorded, not the grant of a property right pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment." Id. 
"The sovereign's immunity from suit exists whatever * * * 
the source of the right sought to be enforced. It applies alike 
to causes of action arising under acts of Congress and to those 
arising from some violation of rights conferred upon the citizen 
by the Constitution." Id. at 582 (citations omitted). 
In Faircloucrh the plaintiff sought to protect some property 
right (apparently ease of access to his land). 354 P.2d at 106. 
In Lynch the plaintiffs had contracts that were "property" 
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protected under the Fifth Amendment. 292 U.S. at 579. But, as 
those cases show, property rights do not translate into a right 
to sue the State. 354 P.2d at 106-107; 292 U.S. at 581. There 
is no right to sue the State without its consent. 
Although Lynch concerned only the Fifth Amendment, this 
Court specifically noted that the word "damaged11 in Art. I, Sec. 
22, makes no difference; "[b]y no stretch of the imagination 
could this alter the principle involved." Fairclough at 107. 
There was nothing new or radical in Fairclough. Its holding 
already was Utah law. The Court stated a compelling line of 
Utah authority for the fundamental principle that the State can 
be sued only if it first consents. Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 
483, 492, 134 Pac. 626, 630 (1913)(the State was sued when it 
flooded land); State Road Comm'n v. Fourth District Court, 94 
Utah 384, 389, 78 P.2d 502, 504 (1937)("The State cannot be sued 
unless it has given its consent or has waived its immunity"); and 
other authorities cited, 354 P.2d at 107-108. 
That was the law13 when the Causeway was breached in 1984. 
±J
 In 1968, in Hampton v. State Road Comm'n, 21 Utah2d 34 2, 
445 P.2d 708, the Court held that "vibration, dust and noise" 
caused to plaintiff's property was mere "damage," and sovereign 
immunity barred any claim therefor. 445 P.2d at 709, 712. 
The plaintiff also claimed a taking of the right of street 
access to his property, and the Court, relying on Justice Wolfe's 
dissent in State Road Comm. v. Fourth District Court, 94 Utah 
384, 78 P.2d 502 (1938), apparently found immunity to be inap-
plicable. The Court remanded for a determination of whether a 
taking had occurred. Hampton. 445 P.2d at 709, 712. 
In disregarding immunity, Hampton is anomalous. It does 
not comport with this Court's decisions before or after. In 
subsequent cases, the Court completely disregarded Hampton in 
deciding the same issues. E.g., Anderson Investment Corp. v. 
. (continued...) 
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There was no waiver of immunity; no right to sue the State under 
Art. I, Sec. 22; and (as this Court had explained) the State 
violated no Constitutional right by invoking its immunity. 
Fairclough, 354 P.2d at 106, 107; Holt, supra, 30 Utah2d 4, 511 
P.2d 1286 (1973); Walton v. State, 558 P.2d 609, 611 (Utah 1976). 
In fact, shortly before the Causeway breach, the State's 
immunity in flooding cases was even more demonstrable than ever 
before. During the same 1984 legislative session that produced 
the Great Salt Lake Causeway Act, the Legislature also enacted, 
as companion legislation, the "floodwaters"-immunity amendment to 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Section 63-3 0-3 (ante at 1). 
In 1987, in Section 63-30-10.5, the Legislature did give 
consent for suits against the State under Art. I, Sec. 22. But 
Section 63-3 0-10.5 does not diminish the State's immunity here.14 
13(...continued) 
State, 28 Utah2d 379, 503 P.2d 144 (1972); Holt v. State Road 
Comm'n, 30 Utah2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973); Walton v. State, 558 
P.2d 609, 611 (Utah 1976). (While Hampton was cited in Utah 
State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 929 n.2 (Utah 1974), it 
was not on the immunity issue.) 
Indeed, whereas Hampton purported to rely on Justice Wolfe's 
dissent in Fourth District Court, supra, the cases decided after 
Hampton do the opposite (the Court required a strict reading of 
the majority opinion in Fourth District Court). Anderson, supra, 
503 P.2d at 146; Holt, 511 P.2d at 1287 n.l. We submit that 
Hampton was simply wrong, and this Court apparently has agreed. 
The validity of Hampton is doubtful also because of its 
reliance on Section 78-11-9, which was repealed soon thereafter 
(1971). And, in any event, Colman can take no comfort from 
Hampton, which expressly held that a claim of property damage 
from "the deposit of excessive amounts of dust" (which is Col-
man's allegation here) is barred by sovereign immunity. 445 P.2d 
at 708-9. 
1 4
 Section 63-30-10.5 gives consent for suit against the 
State under Art. I, Sec. 22. It simply does what Fairclough 
(continued...) 
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said the Legislature would have to do if the State were ever to 
be subject to suit under the Constitutional provision. 
Section 63-30-10.5 ("Section 10.5") has no effect (i.e., 
there is no waiver of immunity ) where (as here) the plaintiff 
fails as a matter of law to state a claim in eminent domain. 
(That is, if there was no "taking," a plaintiff has no benefit 
from Section 10.5.) 
Moreover, Section 10.5 does not (and does not purport to) 
countermand the "floodwaters" immunity provision of Section 63-
30-3 ("Section 3"). 
Rules of construction require that Section 3 be given its 
full effect and scope. First, this Court has required a specific 
rule of construction for the Governmental Immunity Act: The Act 
must "be strictly applied to preserve sovereign immunity"; and 
immunity can be waived "only as clearly expressed therein." Holt 
v. State Road Comm'n, 30 Utah2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286, 1288 (1973) 
(citations omitted). 
Since the purpose of Section 3 unequivocally is to preserve 
sovereign immunity, it should be "strictly applied" to that end. 
Id. And Section 10.5 should be construed with deference to 
Section 3. 
Second, Section 3 and Section 10.5, both part of the Im-
munity Act, "should be construed with reference to each other and 
harmonized, if possible." Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 
1318 (Utah 1983). 
These two provisions can easily be harmonized by giving each 
its straightforward effect. Section 3 declares that governmental 
entities "are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting 
from those [floodwater-management] activities." (Emphasis add-
ed.) Section 10.5, read in harmony, therefore waives immunity 
for all "takings" of property except those resulting from flood-
water-management . 
That is also exactly the construction required by yet a 
third canon: "[The] provision which is more specific in its 
application [here, Section 3!s very specific immunity for flood-
water management] will govern over that which is more general." 
Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). 
Finally, whatever it denotes, Section 10.5 does not help 
Colman in this case because it was enacted three years after 
Colman's alleged injury. It applies only prospectively. 
(continued...) 
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c. 
Immunity and Self-Executing Provisions. As Fairclough 
shows, "Constitutional provisions are not necessarily self-
executing. [Insofar] as they either expressly or by necessary 
implication require legislative action to implement them, they 
are not effective until that legislative action is had." Connec-
ticut v. Sanabria, 192 Conn. 671, 687-88, 474 A.2d 760, 770-71 
(1984), quoting State ex rel. Cotter v. Leipner, 138 Conn. 153, 
158, 83 A.2d 169, 171 (1951). 
14(...continued) 
It is a "well-established rule that statutory enactments 
which affect substantive or vested rights generally operate only 
prospectively." Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 
998, 1000 (Utah 1982). Only procedural rules apply retroactive-
ly, where they "do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or 
contractual rights." Id. 
When the State breached the Causeway, it clearly had full 
immunity for managing floodwaters. Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 
483, 134 Pac. 626, 630 (1913); Section 63-30-3. That immunity is 
the State's substantive right, which cannot be nullified by 
retroactive application of a statute that does not clearly 
require retroactivity. Nor may Colman's substantive rights, if 
any, be improved by retroactivity. 
In managing the flood emergency, the State was exercising 
its police powers for the public good. It did so on the reason-
able expectation that it would have immunity as it made its 
decisions. Given this Court's many explicit decisions supporting 
sovereign immunity (e.g., Fairclough), the State's expectation of 
immunity was obviously well founded. 
Moreover, considering the political and fiscal milieu of 
1987, it is virtually inconceivable that the Legislature intended 
to make Section 10.5 retroactive. The State's financial condi-
tion was dismal, and it is not reasonable to infer that the Leg-
islature intended to retroactively waive the State's immunity and 
thereby open the treasury to unknown numbers of potential claims. 
(Indeed, in 1987 the State budget was so bad that the Legislature 
passed H.B. 310, a supplemental appropriations act, which abro-
gated appropriations already made, and cut the already-lean 
budget by over $26 million.) 
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"A constitutional provision * * * is not self-executing when 
it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by 
means of which those principles may be given the force of law." 
Sanabria, supra, 474 A.2d at 771, quoting Davis v. Burke, 179 
U.S. 399, 403 (1900)(quoting Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 
99) . 
Many constitutional provisions are not self-executing. 
E.g. , Faircloucrh, supra (Art. I, Sec. 22) ; State v. Burks, 75 
N.M. 19, 399 P.2d 920, 921 (1965)(N.M. Constitutional provision 
that "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation" does not give consent to sue the 
state)(decided before enactment of express statutory waiver of 
immunity); Brunke v. Ridley Tp., 154 Pa.Super. 182, 35 A.2d 751, 
752 (1944)(the eminent domain "provision of the Constitution is 
not self-executing") ; State v. Colorado Postal Telecrr. , 104 Colo. 
436, 91 P.2d 481, 484 (1939)(same); Colorado v. Dist. Court, 207 
F.2d 50, 57 (10th Cir. 1953)(same); Connecticut v. Sanabria, 
supra (not self-executing on right to probable-cause hearing in 
criminal cases); Timm v. Schoenwald, 400 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 
1987)(not self-executing on right to judicial review of election 
contests). 
Of course, whether or not a particular constitutional provi-
sion is self-executing depends on its own language and circum-
stances. But that question (of self-execution) has nothing to 
do with sovereign immunity. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 
(1979). One must not "confus[e] the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff [have] a cause of 
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action." Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 112 
(1984), quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 3 37 
U.S. 682, 692-93 (1949). They are separate concepts.15 Immunity 
bars claims (regardless of whether a provision is self-execut-
ing) .16 
ib
 Fairclough, supra. 
1 6
 This was the issue in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 
(1979). Pleading directly under the Fifth Amendment (invoking no 
enabling legislation), a former congressional staff member sued 
her erstwhile employer, a Congressman, who asserted immunity. 
To decide whether she could maintain her suit, the Court subject-
ed her claim to a series of analytical tests: (1) whether the 
Constitution provided the "right" she claimed; (2) whether she 
had a cause of action to assert the right; (3) whether a damages 
remedy was an appropriate form of relief; and (4) if all of the 
foregoing were decided in her favor, whether immunity neverthe-
less barred the claim. 442 U.S. at 234, 235, 236, 244, 249. 
In Davis, the Court did not decide whether the defendant 
actually had immunity, because the lower court had not considered 
it. Id. at 249. It was remanded for that consideration. (Three 
of the Justices opined the immunity issue should have been 
decided first because it could have ended the case without more. 
See separate dissenting opinions of Justices Stewart and Powell, 
each joined by Justice Rehnquist, 442 U.S. at 251-254 and n.3.) 
But the Court did show that immunity will bar causes of action 
that arise directly under the Constitution. 
The Court held the Fifth Amendment to be self-executing. 
Id. at 230 ("a cause of action and a damages remedy can * * * be 
implied directly under the * * * Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment"); and at 249 (plaintiff had a "cause of action under 
the Fifth Amendment, and * * * her injury may be redressed by a 
damages remedy"). But the claim was nevertheless subject to the 
defendant's immunity (once established on remand). Id. 
Immunity is a distinct principle with its own legal effect. 
Where it exists, it does so irrespective of the separate con-
sideration of whether a provision is self-executing. One cannot 
avoid immunity on the mere proposition that a provision is self-
executing and therefore creates a cause of action. For, as the 
Court has said in a somewhat different context, if that were 
enough, "A plaintiff would need only to claim an invasion of his 
legal rights in order to override sovereign immunity." Penn-
hurst , supra, 465 U.S. at 112 (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). "Except in rare cases it would make the constitutional 
doctrine of sovereign immunity a nullity." Id. 
23 
d. 
Immunity Under Fifth Amendment. Two points of federal law 
need to be explained in relation to Colman's Fifth Amendment 
claim. First, the Taking Clause is self-executing. First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 
S.Ct. 2378, 2386 (1987). That is, no enabling statute need exist 
or be pled as the basis for bringing the claim; a plaintiff need 
only invoke the Fifth Amendment.17 
1 7
 In First English, the issue of self-execution was pursued 
by an amicus curiae, the U.S. Solicitor General. The plaintiff 
(the church) had raised the Fifth Amendment but had not pled 42 
U.S.C. 1983, "the damage remedy provided by Congress under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee ("U.S. Amicus Brief") 
at 9, in First English. 
The Solicitor General argued (U.S. Amicus Brief 9, 14) the 
plaintiff should have pled under Section 1983 because the Fifth 
Amendment alone was insufficient basis for the suit; but the 
Court disagreed. 107 S.Ct. at 2386. The Court concluded the 
Fifth Amendment is a self-executing "remedial provision" (id. 
n.9) that does not need statutory enactment such as by Section 
1983. The Court did not hold that the Fifth Amendment nullifies 
the State's immunity. 
In First English no party-defendant raised sovereign im-
munity as a defense. Immunity clearly was not at issue. Rather, 
the question, raised by the amicus, was one of proper pleading. 
U.S. Amicus Brief 9, 14. In that connection, the Amicus Brief 
discussed sovereign immunity as one of "[t]hree important in-
dicia" that the Fifth Amendment did not self-effectuate a damage 
remedy. Id. at 16. 
The Court referred to immunity only once, 107 S.Ct. 2 386 
n.9, and only to reject the amicus!s argument that immunity 
prevented the Fifth Amendment from being interpreted as self-
executing. U.S. Amicus Brief 16. 
The Court did not address or purport to change the principle 
of Lynch v. United States, supra (sovereign immunity applies 
against takings claims asserted under the Constitution, 292 U.S. 
at 582); and the U.S. Amicus Brief (at 18) had quoted Lynch on 
that point. Lynch is still good law. (Note that Lynch itself 
did not address whether the Fifth Amendment is self-executing, 
(continued...) 
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Second, the State's immunity against Colman's Fifth Amend-
ment claim "raises a question of federal law." Martinez v. 
California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980); Felder v. Casey, 108 
S.Ct 2302 (1988). Since the State's immunity is recognized by, 
and accords with, federal law, Colman's federal claim (like his 
state-law claim) is barred .18 
17(...continued) 
but only the separate issue of immunity.) 
A further indication that the Court did not intend to affect 
sovereign immunity is the authority it cites for its holding that 
the Constitution is self-executing. The Court (107 S.Ct. at 
2386), cites only cases in which no party asserted immunity. In 
those cases, Clarke, San Diego Gas, Jacobs, Kirbv Forest, Causbv, 
Seaboard Air, and Mononaahela, immunity was not an issue. (In-
deed, Justice Henroid in Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 
Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157, 171 (1960), showed in detail that 
Jacobs is not "authority for the proposition that [the consti-
tutional eminent domain provision] waives sovereign immunity.") 
Of the Court's cited cases, only Armstrong v. U.S., deals with 
any sort of immunity, but it was "[t]he sovereign's immunity 
against materialmen's liens," 364 U.S. 40, 42 (1960); immunity 
was not asserted against the takings claim in that case. 
The State is immune from Colman's claims and First English 
is not to the contrary. 
1 8
 In Felder, supra, the plaintiff sued in state court, 
alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 
invoking Section 1983. The defendants were a city and certain of 
its policemen. 108 S.Ct. at 2304-5. 
The plaintiff had failed to comply with the state-law 
notice-of-claim requirement, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court held 
the complaint must be dismissed on the basis of state law. Id. 
at 2305-6. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the basis of 
federal preemption. 
The Court explained it was invalidating a notice-of-claim 
statute that was part of legislation "governing the righ[t] * * * 
to sue the State's subdivisions." 108 S.Ct at 2308 (emphasis 
added). It was a limited "waiver of local governmental immun-
ity." Id. Because under Monell v. New York City, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978), local governments (as opposed to State government) 
already were subject to Section 1983 claims, Felder seems to say 
nothing new; it does not purport to invalidate the State's 
(continued...) 
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State sovereign immunity has long been recognized and 
honored as a matter of federal law. The states, of course, ex-
isted as sovereigns before they created a federal government and 
constitution. The union of these several states was accomplished 
only after proponents of the new government convinced the others 
that states would retain their essential sovereignty (including 
immunity from suit). 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which states the 
18(...continued) 
immunity here. Indeed, the Court noted that "of course11 federal 
law provides immunity for State defendants. 108 S.Ct. at 2 3 07. 
There clearly is immunity for a state qua state. See, e.g., 
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341-43 (1979). 
Also, Felder found preemption because conflicting state law 
would "frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in 
[sec] 1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is 
asserted in state or federal court." Felder, 108 S.Ct. at 2 3 07. 
Therefore, under Felder, a plaintiff may obtain prospective 
injunctive relief under sec. 1983 against government officials in 
state court "to the same extent as in federal court," but she is 
not entitled "to any greater relief * * * in the state courts 
than she could obtain in federal court." Truesdale v. Univ. of 
N.C., 91 N.C.App. 186, 371 S.E.2d 503, 508, 510 (1988). "The 
effect of this decision is to insure that plaintiff's relief, if 
any, will be the same [in state court as] in federal court under 
* * * Section 1983. We note that in federal court the Eleventh 
Amendment * * * would mandate the same result we have reached in 
this case." Id. at 510 (citing cases). The State has immunity 
against compensation claims in both state and federal court. 
Martinez, supra, also does not impair the State's immunity. 
The question there involved state employees sued under Section 
1983 in their personal capacities (i.e., no question of State 
immunity or liability was before the Court, 444 U.S. at 279 and 
285 n.ll). Note also that, on the merits, no claim had been 
stated under Section 1983. Martinez should not be given an 
"expansive reading." Kristensen v. Strinden, 343 N.W.2d 67, 75 
(N.D. 1983). 
If they affect a state's immunity at all, Felder and Mar-
tinez mean at most that a state's immunity against federal claims 
is limited to that permitted by federal law. Since the State's 
immunity in our case fully comports with federal law, Colman's 
claim is barred. 
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federal judicial powers, "was a matter of concern and active 
debate in the state ratifying conventions," Mossman v. Donahey, 
46 Ohio St.2d 1, 6-7, 346 N.E.2d 305, 309 (1976), citing III 
Elliott, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption 
of the Federal Constitution ("Debates") 318-19; Jacobs, The 
Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 33. 
Some (including Patrick Henry) argued the new constitution 
would subject the states to suit against their will. Id. "James 
Madison replied * * * that the Judiciary Clause did not disturb 
the principle of sovereign immunity with regard to suits by 
individuals." Id. "'It is not in the power of individuals to 
call any state into court. The only operation it [Article III] 
can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against 
a citizen [of another state], it must be brought before the 
federal court.1" Id., quoting Madison, "Debates" 533. 
John Marshall agreed, as did Alexander Hamilton, who stated: 
"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable 
to the suit of an individual without its consent." Mossman, 
supra, at 309 (emphasis in original). This immunity, "as one of 
the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government 
of every State in the Union." Hamilton in The Federalist No. 81, 
at 487 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) . Hamilton emphasized that the 
Constitution did not work a surrender of state immunity. Id. 
"[I]t seems fair to say that the ratifiers * * * were 
assured by the leading Federalists that they might rely upon the 
preservation of state sovereign immunity under the Constitution 
* * *." Mossmanf supra, 346 N.E.2d at 309. 
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Thus was sovereign immunity understood. The federal con-
stitution made a few clear exceptions to immunity (not relevant 
here), but otherwise state immunity was to remain intact (and 
states were always immune in their own courts). The Constitu-
tion presupposes this immunity. 
Unfortunately, at first the Supreme Court saw things dif-
ferently; in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), the Court 
assumed original jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen of 
South Carolina against the State of Georgia. "The five partici-
pating justices delivered five separate opinions." Only Justice 
Iredell, in dissent, honored the state's immunity. Mossman, 346 
N.E.2d at 310. 
"The Court's judgment and its rejection of state sovereign 
immunity 'fell upon the country with a profound shock. Both the 
Bar and the [general] public['s] * * * surprise was warranted, 
[given] the fact that the vesting of any such jurisdiction over 
sovereign States had been expressly disclaimed and even resented 
by the great defenders of the Constitution * * *.»»• id., quoting 
1 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 9 6 (1922). 
Two days after Chisholm was decided, the Senate proposed the 
Eleventh Amendment, which was ratified five years later. Mossman 
at 310. "The purpose of the Amendment was to overrule Chisholm 
and to reassert the principles of state sovereignty rejected in 
that decision." Id. Since its ratification, the Eleventh Amend-
ment has been construed by the Supreme Court "in accordance with 
the expressed views of the Founding Fathers and of Justice 
Iredell in his dissent in Chisholm, as affirming that state 
28 
sovereign immunity to suits by individuals is a constitutional 
right." Mossman, 346 N.E.2d at 311. 
In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Court held 
that, despite the Eleventh Amendment's silence on the question, 
a state may not be sued in federal court by one of its own 
citizens (unless the state consents). Hans showed from the 
constitutional debates that states were to have their sovereign 
immunity. Id. at 13-15. The plaintiff's suit "strain[ed] the 
Constitution" in a way "never imagined or dreamed of." Id. at 
15. It was "almost an absurdity on its face" to suppose the 
Eleventh Amendment would allow suit against a state "by its own 
citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States." Id. 
As shown in Mossman v. Donahey, supra, "state sovereign 
immunity is a right of constitutional proportions, whether it is 
considered to derive from the plan of the Constitution itself, or 
from the Eleventh Amendment * * *." 346 N.E.2d at 312. "[A]s to 
suits by individuals [i.e., not other states or the United 
States] against a state, the plan of the Constitution envisions 
no * * * surrender of immunity, as demonstrated by the statements 
of the Founding Fathers, * * * the Eleventh Amendment, and the 
language of numerous decisions of the Supreme Court." Id.19 
L3
 One justifiable view is that the Eleventh Amendment 
directly immunizes the state against federal claims in state 
court. E.g., Mossman, supra. Another view finds the same immun-
ity in the common law and by "compelling analogy" to the Eleventh 
Amendment (which arguably "on its face governs [only] the federal 
judicial power"). Hill v. Dept. of Corrections, 513 So.2d 129, 
132 (Fla. 1987), quoting Karchefske v. Dept. of Mental Health, 
143 Mich.App. 1, 371 N.W.2d 876, 881 (1985). 
(continued...) 
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Other courts agree with the Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion 
in Mossman that "a state may not be sued for damages by an indi-
vidual under federal law, without its consent, and that this 
principle applies equally to state as well as federal courts." 
346 N.E.2d at 315 (emphasis added). 
In Hill v. Dept. of Corrections, 513 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1987), 
a Section 1983 case brought in state court,20 the Florida Supreme 
Court held the State immune on the basis of common law immunity. 
"We reject [the] argument11 "that the state has no common law 
immunity against a suit brought under federal law alleging the 
violation of a federal constitutional right." Id. at 131. 
In Makanui v. Dept. of Education, 721 P.2d 165 (Haw.App. 
1986) , the principle was aptly explained: "Immunity in state 
court from [sec] 1983 damages liability is a question of federal 
law, and conduct * * * cognizable under that provision cannot be 
13(...continued) 
Such distinctions are probably academic, however, because 
immunity is clearly required under either view. And regardless 
of labels or phraseology, this much is clear: States have had 
sovereign immunity since before the framing of the Constitution, 
and the Eleventh Amendment memorializes that immunity (with the 
few exceptions it clearly allows). States seem to be immune from 
federal claims as a matter of constitutionalized common law. See 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), in which the Court held 
a state prosecutor immune from a Section 1983 claim because of 
"the immunity historically accorded * * * at common law." Id. at 
418, 421, 427. 
2 0
 Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it 
simply provides a cause of action or remedy when the U.S. Con-
stitution or other federal law is violated under color of state 
law. Chapman v. Houston Welfare, 441 U.S. 600, 617, 618 (1979). 
Analysis of state sovereign immunity is the same whether the 
plaintiff pleads under Section 1983 or directly under the Con-
stitution. Each of these types of claims "derives from the same 
constitutional source." Rutherford v. State, 188 Cal.App.3d 
1267, 233 Cal.Rptr. 781, 793 (Cal.App. 1987). 
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immunized by state law." Id. at 171, citing Martinez v. Califor-
nia, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980). "Under [sec] 1983, a state 
cannot be sued unless it has consented to be sued or has other-
wise waived its sovereign immunity. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 
U.S. 332, 341 * * * (1979) (in enacting [sec] 1983, Congress did 
not intend to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the 
states); 15 Am.Jur.2d Civil Rights [sec] 268 (1985).fl Makanui 
at 171. Hawaii has not waived its sovereign immunity. Id. 
State immunity prevailed also in Fetterman v. University of 
Connecticut, 473 A.2d 1176 (Conn. 1984). "[S]overeign immunity 
was well established at common law [when Section] 1983 was 
enacted. It is supported by a strong policy reason; that is, to 
prevent * * * enormous fiscal burdens on states." Id. at 1182, 
citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), and 
Quern v. Jordan, supra. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in Kristensen v. Strinden, 
343 N.W.2d 67 (N.D. 1983), likewise held the state immune from an 
"action for the alleged violation of Federal constitutional 
rights." Id. at 75. The plaintiff argued that "the only ab-
solute immunity available to a State in a [sec] 1983 action is 
[under] the Eleventh Amendment and * * * the Supremacy Clause 
requires [state courts] to cast aside State law, including 
sovereign immunity, if it is inconsistent with the commands of 
the United States Constitution." Id. The Court authoritatively 
rejected those arguments. 
In Lowery v. Dept. of Corrections, 146 Mich.App. 342, 380 
N.W.2d 99, 106 (1985), the court relied on clear U.S. Supreme 
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Court authority to show that Congress had not intended to "abro-
gate a state's sovereign immunity" under Section 1983; and there 
is no reason to subject states to Section 1983 actions in state 
courts, "while barring [such actions] in federal forums." The 
State has immunity in all courts. 
Other cases immunizing states against federal constitutional 
claims in state court include: Thiboutot v. Maine, 405 A.2d 230, 
237 (Me. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 
U.S. 1 (1980); Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 104 
N.M. 302, 720 P.2d 1243 (N.M.App.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 940 
(1986); Rutherford v. State, 188 Cal.App.3d 1267, 233 Cal.Rptr. 
781, 791-93 (Cal.App. 1987); Kapil v. Ass'n of Pa. State College, 
448 A.2d 717 (Pa.Cmwlth 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 470 A.2d 
482 (Pa. 1983); and DeBleecker v. Montgomery County, 292 Md. 498, 
438 A.2d 1348, 1356 n.4 (1982); Truesdale v. Univ. of N.C., 91 
N.C.App. 186, 371 S.E.2d 503, 510 (1988); also see Troyer v. 
Dept. of Health, 722 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1986). 
Supreme Court precedent definitely supports the principle 
that states have immunity against federal claims asserted in 
state court.21 "[T]he fundamental principle enunciated in Hans 
2 1
 So far as we know, however, the Court has not decided the 
precise question of whether immunity bars a federal claim as-
serted against a state in state court. But the principles 
declared in the Court's many decisions leave little douat, we 
submit, that the Court would sustain the state's immunity in such 
a case, as have many state courts already. 
The Court has rejected the argument that since states cannot 
be sued in federal court, they must be suable in state court 
because violations of federal law might otherwise go unredressed. 
See Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 2953 
(1987). One must remember that immunity is itself the State's 
(continued...) 
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fv. Louisiana, supra] has been among the most stable in our 
constitutional jurisprudence.11 Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways, 
107 S.Ct. 2941, 2952 (1987). Hans "firmly established that the 
Eleventh Amendment embodies a broad constitutional principle of 
sovereign immunity." Id. And that doctrine has "a clear ration-
ale." Id. 
In Welch, the Court addressed the argument that sovereign 
immunity protects states from the consequences of their illegal 
conduct. As the Court noted, "Relief often may be obtained 
through suits against state officials rather than the State 
itself, or through injunctive or other prospective remedies." 
Id. at 2953, citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
"Municipalities and other local government agencies may be sued 
under [Section] 1983." Id., citing Monell v. New York City, 436 
U.S. 658 (1978). "In addition, the States may provide relief by 
! 
waiving their immunity from suit in state court on state-law 
claims. That States are not liable in other circumstances is a 
necessary consequence of their role in a system of dual sover-
eignties." Welch at 2953 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). 
21(...continued) 
constitutional right, that it rests on sound policy, and that it 
is vital to effective government. 
Sovereign immunity is not bad; and it should not be rejected 
simply because it occasionally might work a hardship on certain 
plaintiffs. For if that were the test, the sovereign should also 
be denied the power to tax, which regularly works a hardship on 
many citizens. Both the State's authority to tax and its sover-
eign immunity serve the public's legitimate needs, and both are 
for the Legislature to determine. John H. v. Brunelle, 500 A.2d 
350, 351 (N.H. 1985). Also see Welch, supra, at 2952-53. 
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 [S]overeign immunity is required by the structure of the 
federal system, * * * [and it] has been deeply embedded in our 
federal system from its inception." Id. (internal quotation 
omitted). 
As noted in Hill v. Dept. of Corrections, 513 So.2d 129, 132 
(Fla. 1987), the Eleventh Amendment Mexemplifi[es] * * * the fun-
damental rule that 'a State may not be sued without its consent.1 
Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 * * * (1921), 
quoted in [Pennhurst, supra, 1 465 U.S. 89, 98[-99] * * * (1984).ff 
And that rule applies regardless of the claim's asserted basis. 
A constitutional claim is no more able to override immunity 
than is any other type of claim.22 The very purpose of Section 
2 2
 The Supreme Court routinely has recognized immunity 
against federal constitutional claims asserted directly under the 
Constitution (without enabling legislation). E.g., Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)(First Amendment claim); Anderson 
v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987)(Fourth Amendment); Lynch v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934)(Fifth Amendment); Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)(Fifth Amendment); and Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980)(Eighth Amendment). This sort of 
claim, like any other, is subject to state immunity in state 
court. Rutherford v. State, 188 Cal.App.3d 12 67, 23 3 Cal.Rptr. 
781, 793 (Cal.App. 1987). 
Under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has found immunity 
also against claims asserted under Section 1983 or other federal 
statutes. E.g., Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways, 107 S.Ct. 2941 
(1987)(Jones Act)(overruling Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 
U.S. 184 (1964)); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)(federal 
statute and Equal Protection Clause); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 
183 (1984)(Section 1983 and Due Process Clause). 
Because of the Eleventh Amendment, no federal court may 
award "damages against the state treasury even though the claim 
arises under the Constitution." Pennhurst State School v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 (1984), citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 
U.S. 332 (1979). And "if a [Section] 1983 claim is brought 
directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal 
court from granting any relief on that claim." Id., citing 
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)(emphasis added). 
(continued...) 
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1983, for example, is to provide "a cause of action11 or Ma 
remedy" when rights "secured by the Constitution" are violated 
under color of state law. Chapman v. Houston Welfare, 441 U.S. 
600, 617, 618 (1979). But Section 1983 actions do not "override 
the traditional sovereign immunity of the States." Quern v. 
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). And "one of the most 'tradi-
tional1 dimensions of state sovereign immunity is that which 
states historically have enjoyed in their own courts from most 
suits for money damages. * * * [T]hat * * * immunity clearly 
preexisted Section 1983 * * *." Kristensen, supra, 343 N.W.2d 
67, 76 (N.D. 1983), quoting Kapil, supra, 448 A.2d at 720 (em-
phasis in original). 
"It follows" that the State's immunity against federal 
constitutional claims is not limited to being free from suit in 
federal courts; it also bars those claims in state court. Kapil, 
supra, 448 A.2d at 720. 
"The right of individuals to sue a state, in either a 
federal or a state court, cannot be derived from the Constitution 
or laws of the United States. It can come only from the consent 
of the state." Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32, 34 (1918). Accord, 
Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857); Maloney v. 
State, 207 Misc. 894, 141 N.Y.S.2d 207, 213 (NY Ct.Cl. 1955). 
22(...continued) 
Pennhurst held that the states1 Eleventh Amendment immunity 
bars a federal court from hearing federal-law or state-law 
claims, even if they otherwise would be within the court's 
jurisdiction. 465 U.S. at 120. 
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e. 
Colman's Suit is Barred, The State emphatically asserts its 
immunity against all of Colman's claims. There was no waiver;23 
and if there had been, the waiver would have to be construed 
"strictly in favor of the sovereign." Library of Congress v. 
Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986); Fairclough, supra, 354 P.2d 105 
(Utah 1960); Holt, supra, 511 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973). Colman's 
suit is barred.24 
2. No Cognizable Property Right 
If Colman could overcome sovereign immunity, his takings 
claim would still fail because he has no cognizable, protectable 
property right in this case. 
Article I, Section 22, and the Fifth Amendment concern only 
"property." But "[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by 
2 3
 Section 63-30-10(1)(d) expressly preserves immunity 
against civil rights claims. While that provision is now modi-
fied by the 1987 enactment of Section 63-30-10.5 (waiver for 
"takings"), civil rights claims, including "takings" claims, were 
barred when Colman's claim arose. 
2 4
 A constitutional claim is just as subject to immunity and 
dismissal as any other claim. A claim sounding in the constitu-
tion is easily alleged, but "[u]nless the complaint states a 
compensable claim for relief . . ., it should not survive a 
motion to dismiss." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808 
(1982)(internal quotation and citation omitted). "Insubstantial 
lawsuits can be quickly terminated by * * * courts alert to the 
possibilities of artful pleading." Id. " [Constitutional 
[claims] need not proceed to trial." Id. Indeed, one of the 
purposes of immunity "is to protect public officials from the 
broad-ranging discovery that can be peculiarly disruptive of 
effective government." Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. 3 034, 
3042 n.6 (1987)(internal quotations and citation omitted). 
After all, "the entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than 
a mere defense to liability, and * * * it is effectively lost if 
a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." State v. Hogg, 
311 Md. 446, 535 A.2d 923, 927 (1988) (emphasis in original), 
quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
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the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions 
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)(citation and internal quotations 
omitted).25 We must f,conside[r] property not as a particular 
thing but rather as the legal relations relating thereto. * * * 
[P]roperty consists of the legal relations between persons in 
respect to a thing." Boyer, Survey of the Law of Property 4 (3rd 
ed. 1981), citing Restatement of Property, sec. 3. 
ff[N]ot all economic interests are 'property rights1; only 
those economic advantages are 'rights1 which have the law back of 
them, and only when they are so recognized may courts compel 
others to forbear from interfering with them or to compensate for 
their invasion." United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 
U.S. 499, 502 (1945); Utah Road Comm'n v. Hansen, 14 Utah2d 305, 
383 P.2d 917, 920 (1963). Whether Colman has "legally protected 
interests" depends in part on his "rights in the land" and "the 
navigable or non-navigable nature of the waters" involved. 
Willow River, 324 U.S. at 503. 
For at least two basic reasons, Colman has no cognizable, 
protectable property right in this case. First is the lease be-
tween Colman and the State. Second is the Public Trust Doctrine. 
" State law normally defines "property" in "takings" cases. 
Generally, "the United States, as opposed to the several States, 
[is not] possessed of residual authority that enables it to 
define 'property1 in the first instance." Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980). 
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a. 
The Lease, The lease created Colman's property right (i.e., 
the right to use the state-owned lakebed), and the lease governs 
and limits that right. Colman has no property right beyond that 
permitted in the lease. And so long as the State acted in 
accordance with the lease, Colman doesnft even have a claim for 
breach of contract, much less a constitutional "takings" claim. 
The lease subordinates Colmanfs right to use the ditch or 
right-of-way. For example, the parties agreed the State would be 
free to create other easements or rights-of-way that might 
conflict with the "ditch." Specifically, the State could allow 
other easements "upon, through, or in the land hereby leased as 
may be necessary or appropriate." Lease art. IV (Exh. IP, p.2). 
That agreement eviscerates any claim that the State could be 
liable for breaching the Causeway and allowing a flow of water to 
pass over the ditch. 
Colman also agreed: "Neither party shall be liable to the 
other for any loss or damage suffered or incurred * * * by reason 
or as a result of * * * acts of God or the public enemy * * * 
[or] floods * * *." Art. XIV (Exh. IP, p.4). That provision 
clearly covers this case and insulates the State from liability. 
Lease article I states the obvious: the "lease is granted 
subject to the laws of the State of Utah," expressly including 
future Board regulations. That statement is legally unnecessary, 
because all contract rights and property rights are automatically 
subject to all valid laws and exercises of the police power. 
Retan v. Salt Lake City, 226 Pac. 1095 (Utah 1924); George v. 
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Oren Ltd. & Assoc., 672 P.2d 732, 737-38 (Utah 1983). And the 
Great Salt Lake Causeway Act and the resulting breach constitute 
a proper exercise of the police power, as Colman concedes. Col-
man's Supp. Brief 13 n.ll. 
By operation of law and by virtue of Colmanfs express 
agreement, Colman's right to use the ditch is a limited right. 
By contract, his right is always subordinate to the exercise of 
the State's right to take action such as breaching the Causeway. 
Colman has no property right beyond that point. He has no 
property right in the ditch that could be "taken" by the State's 
breaching of the Causeway, and the State cannot be made liable 
for the damacre he alleges. 
b. 
The Public Trust Doctrine. The second reason Colman has no 
cognizable, protectable property right in the lakebed in this 
case is the Public Trust Doctrine. It relates to the Equal 
Footing Doctrine, the basic principle of Constitutional law that 
all states own and control the beds of their navigable waters. 
Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367 (1842); Shivelv v. Bowlby, 152 
U.S. 1 (1894). Such lakebeds and riverbeds are held by each 
state in trust for the public. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. 
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
The State "may forbid all such acts as would render the 
public right less valuable, or destroy it altogether. This power 
results from the ownership of the soil, from the legislative 
jurisdiction of the State over it, and from its duty to preserve 
unimpaired those public uses for which the soil is held." Smith 
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v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (1855). 
Since the State's Primary Brief (at 33-39) discusses these 
principles, we will not repeat that discussion; we will, however, 
address Colman's new argument. He argues that the State cannot 
exercise authority under the Public Trust Doctrine ("Doctrine") 
except in matters of commerce, fishing, and navigation, and he 
cites Illinois Central. That is wrong. 
The Doctrine "especially" protects those uses, but it also 
protects "all other public uses." Illinois Central, 14 6 U.S. at 
457. Other cases corroborate that the Doctrine has a more 
expansive purpose.26 See Kootenai Environ'1 Alliance v. Pan-
handle Yacht Club, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085, 1086 (1983). 
Also, contrary to Colman's bald assertion, the Doctrine is 
not merely a matter of common law to be overridden by allegations 
of a taking. That is evident from Illinois Central, in which 
Illinois granted the railroad fee title in lakebed land ("sover-
eign land") in Lake Michigan, and then later revoked the grant 
without compensation. Id. at 450, 460. 
2 6
 In addition to the cases discussed in the State's Primary 
Brief at 33-39, note the various manifestations of public-trust 
authority in these cases: Montana Coalition v. Hildreth, 684 
P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984)(recreation); Wisconsin's Environmental 
Decade v. D.N.R., 85 Wis.2d 518, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978)(fishing, 
hunting, recreation, scenic beauty, and use of chemicals); North 
Dakota State Wat. Comm. v. Bd. of Mgrs., 322 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 
1983)(authority to control drainage of waters from lake); 
Clifton v. Passaic Valley Wat. Comm., 224 N.J.Super. 53, 539 
A.2d 760 (N.J.Super. 1987)(control of drinking water reserves); 
Eldridge v. Trezevant, 16 S.Ct. 345 (1896)(no compensation 
against state under Fourteenth Amendment for state's imposition, 
on private land bordering navigable stream, of servitude to build 
public works); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash.2d 621, 640-41, 747 
P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987)("Recognizing modern science's ability to 
identify the public need, state courts have extended the doctrine 
beyond its navigational aspects."). 
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The Court explained that the State owns the lakebed because 
of its sovereign rights at common law and its constitutional 
right under the Equal Footing Doctrine. Id. at 43 4-437. The 
State's title in these sovereign lands is "different in character 
from that which the state holds in lands intended for sale. * * * 
It is a title held in trust for the people of the state * * *." 
Id. at 452. 
This trust is exercised by the State for the people's 
"common use and as a portion of their inherent sovereignty." 
Id. at 459. Because of the trust, any property right granted in 
the lakebed is necessarily subject to "an implied reservation of 
the public right," and the grantee's right is "void" to the 
extent it conflicts with "public uses for which [the sovereign 
lands] are adapted." Id. at 457, 458. 
Illinois Central held that the grant in fee to the railroad 
"was inoperative to affect, modify, or in any respect to control 
the sovereignty and dominion of the state over the lands, or its 
ownership thereof." Id. at 4 60. 
The Illinois legislature could revoke the grant because the 
railroad's property rights were inherently subject to the State's 
rights under the public trust. Id. Any conflicting "right" was 
void. The railroad had no property right cognizable against the 
State's Public Trust rights.27 
11
 Colman's argument that the Public Trust Doctrine is only 
a common law doctrine is misleading, and is clearly wrong in sug 
gesting that the Doctrine can be overridden by a constitutional 
claim. Illinois Central shows that even a grant of fee title 
cannot constitute or create a property right in the grantee if 
the grant conflicts with the State's public-trust rights. And 
(continued...) 
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The Causeway-breach easily comes within the State's Public-
Trust authority. As a matter of law, Colman has no property 
right equalling the State's Public Trust rights and, therefore, 
he has no cognizable, protectable property right in this case. 
27(...continued) 
since there is no property right, there can be no "taking" of a 
property right. 
The Doctrine has its roots in the pre-Constitution common 
law, but it has carried forward as adjunct to the constitutional 
Equal Footing Doctrine. It is the law in Utah. See, e.g., 
Section 65-1-15(3)(which is now repealed but which applied to 
Colman's lease at all material times)(lease was "subject to the 
use of the waters for public purposes"); Section 65A-6-l(3); 
Section 65A-10-1(1)(sovereign lands and the public trust); 
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982); Utah Const, 
art. XX; State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 Pac. 987, 993 (1927). 
Colman also misunderstands the effect of the Public Trust 
Doctrine when he states: "Colman's use of the ditch has never 
impeded the public's full enjoyment of navigable waters for fish-
ing, navigation or commerce." Colman's Supp. Brief 52. His 
assertion misses the point. The basic principle of the Doctrine 
is that the State does not lose "control [or] sovereignty and 
dominion" over sovereign lands. Illinois Central, 14 6 U.S. at 
460. The grant to Colman of a limited right to use the lakebed 
is necessarily subject to "an implied reservation of the public 
right," and his right is void to the extent it conflicts. Id, at 
457, 458. Colman is subject to the Doctrine by operation of law 
(because he located on the lakebed), and he cannot avoid its 
effect even if he has not "impeded the public's full enjoyment" 
of certain rights in this case. 
Also, if Colman had a cognizable property interest, it 
could not command compensation "even in the case of an actual 
taking," because of the State's special rights in the lakebed. 
Nichols Eminent Domain, sec. 1.42[6], p. 1-266 (referring to the 
federal government's authority to control navigable waters). 
(The same authority and result must apply a fortiori with regard 
to the State because, besides its authority to control and 
regulate the lakebed, People v. California Fish Co., 138 Pac. 79, 
89 (Cal. 1913), the State also owns the lakebed.) Cf. U.S. v. 
Cherokee Nation, 107 S.Ct. 1487, 1490 (1987)(exercise of federal 
navigational servitude, which compares with State's public-trust 
authority, does not invade any private property rights in the 
water or underlying bed, "for the damage * * * does not result 
from taking property * * * within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment but from the lawful exercise of a power to which the 
interests of riparian owners have always been subject"). 
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Obviously, "a property right must exist before it can be taken." 
Orion Corp, v. State, 109 Wash.2d 621, 641, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 
(1987)(en banc)(citation and internal quotation omitted). 
c. 
Colman Has No "Property". The Supreme Court "has dismissed 
•taking1 challenges on the ground that, while the challenged 
government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with 
interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable 
expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property1 for Fifth 
Amendment purposes." Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). 
Colmanfs position is particularly untenable. He voluntarily 
located his business on the bed of a navigable, terminal lake. 
His permission from the State to locate and operate there was 
always subject to the State's overriding authority to manage the 
Lake for the public good.28 Morton International, Inc. v. 
2 8
 Realistically, Colman did not file this lawsuit because 
of his "ditch." If Colman had been in operation, he could have 
pumped brines from the Lake without having any ditch. When the 
ditch was built in 1967, when the water level was very low, the 
ditch may have served to convey lakewater to shore for process-
ing. But by 1984, when the "ditch" was under 10 feet of water, 
there was no need for the ditch. 
We have always maintained that Colman's real concern was the 
Lake's salinity north of the Causeway (where Colman is located). 
That is why he wanted to enjoin the breach. He knew the breach 
would allow the relatively fresh south-side water to dilute the 
more concentrated north-side water. The dilution would require 
him to spend more time evaporating the water from north-side 
brines, thereby slowing his processing. He simply did not want 
to lose the natural advantage found north of the Causeway. 
He also knew, however, that this Court (twice) and the Tenth 
Circuit have held that permittees like Colman have no right to 
have the Lake managed for their benefit. They cannot demand that 
(continued...) 
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Southern Pacific Trans, Co,, 27 Utah2d 256, 259-60, 495 P.2d 31, 
33-34, cert, denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Solar Salt Co. v. 
Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 555 P.2d 286 (Utah 1976); Hardy Salt 
Co. v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 501 F.2d 1156 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974). Water naturally seeks the 
lowest available point, which in this region is the Great Salt 
Lake; and in times of flooding, great volumes of water reach the 
Lake. And breaching the Causeway simply returned the Lake to its 
more natural condition. All things considered, the only "reason-
able expectation" was that the Lake would someday flood, the 
ditch would be covered with water, and the Causeway would be 
breached. 
By those facts and the lease and the Public Trust Doctrine, 
Colman had no property that could be "taken" by the Causeway 
breach. He cannot transmute his claim into a "right" requiring 
compensation. 
3. No "Taking" as a Matter of Law 2 9 
If Colman could overcome sovereign immunity and had a cog-
nizable property right, he would then be required to prove, as a 
28(...continued) 
the Causeway be breached or not breached so as to give them the 
salinity they prefer. Morton, Solar Salt, and Hardy Salt, supra. 
2 9
 Colman alleges that the issue of a "taking" is a question 
of fact. That is not true. It is a question of law. Department 
of Trans, v. Rasmussen, 439 N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ill.App. 1982); Fair-
clough and Holt, supra. The factual basis of an alleged taking 
may become important (Colman certainly would have to be able to 
prove a taking as a matter of fact), but he must first prove his 
claim to be valid as a matter of law. 
Colman's position would work a great hardship on Government. 
It would be grossly unfair to subject the State and other govern-
mental entities to a trial every time someone alleges a taking. 
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matter of law, that his property has been "taken."30 We think he 
cannot do it. The law and common sense are against him. 
Of course, to ask whether there has been a compensable 
"taking" is to ask whether there has been an exercise of eminent 
domain, which stands in contrast to the police power. Colman can 
prevail on this issue only if he shows that in breaching the 
Causeway the State acted outside the police power and "took" his 
property by an exercise of eminent domain. To prove that here, 
he would have to overcome some very substantial precedent. 
"Not every governmental action interfering with a property 
interest is a taking entitling the owner to compensation." 
Charles J. Arndt, Inc. v. Birmingham, 748 F.2d 1486, 1491 (11th 
Cir. 1984). The police power is enforceable though a plaintiff 
may be "deprived of property." Salt Lake City v. Bernhacren, 189 
Pac. 583, 587 (Utah 1920). All rights are subject to reasonable 
police regulation. Thatcher v. Industrial Comm'n. 207 P.2d 178, 
181 (Utah 1949); Retan. supra, 226 Pac. 1095 (Utah 1924). 
J 0
 Indeed, he must prove that his property was "taken" for 
"public use." In breaching the Causeway, the State did not use 
Colmanfs ditch at all. He cannot meet this essential burden. 
He alleged the Causeway breach would send water over his 
ditch. But that allegation does not signify a public use. There 
is no more public use of Colman1s property here than there was 
in McNeil v. <tity of Montague, 268 P.2d 497 (Cal.App. 1954). In 
that case, the court held there was no public use of the plain-
tiff's land when it burned by catching fire from nearby city 
property on which the city was burning weeds. 
The Utah cases also do not help Colman. In the cases 
finding a public use, there was a clear, actual use of the 
affected property. Not so here. See Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 
75 Pac. 371 (1904), aff'd, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Highland Boy Gold 
Min. Co. v. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296 (1904), aff'd, 
200 U.S. 527 (1906); Alcorn v. Reading, 66 Utah 509, 243 Pac. 922 
(1926); Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (1933). 
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,fA statute enacted in the proper exercise of the police 
power, even though it may limit or destroy private property, is 
not a deprivation of property without due process of law.11 Alber 
v. Nolle, 98 N.M. 100, 645 P.2d 456, 461 (1982). For "no one has 
any absolute rights, but they are all conditioned upon the rights 
of others. Everyone in a well-ordered society must make some 
concessions of his individual rights * * * in deference to the 
common good and in recompense for all of [his] other rights 
* * *." Hurst v. Highway Dept., 16 Utah2d 153, 397 P.2d 71, 74 
(1964); also see McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 6 Utah2d 92, 305 
P.2d 1097, 1100 (1957). 
Colman admits the breach and the Great Salt Lake Causeway 
Act constitute proper use of the police power. Incongruously, he 
nevertheless claims compensation. He has no right to compensa-
tion, however, because (almost by his own admission) he cannot 
show that the State acted outside the realm of noncompensable 
police power; he cannot prove that breaching the Causeway was an 
act of eminent domain. 
Issues of noncompensable police power versus compensable 
eminent domain arise in various settings. The cases fall into 
these categories: (a) emergency, (b) flooding, (c) physical 
interference, invasion or occupation, and (d) regulation of 
property.31 
3 1
 We think these four categories encompass all of the 
"takings" cases except straight (formal) condemnation cases. 
Even if we have overlooked other categories, these cases repre-
sent the law that controls this case. 
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a. 
Emergency, "It is the law that in meeting an emergency, 
such as fire, flood or pestilence, public officials and private 
citizens may employ almost any available means in an endeavor to 
control the danger." Short v. Pierce County, 78 P.2d 610, 614 
(Wash. 1938)-Lewis, supra, 303 S.E.2d 112 (Ga. 1983) (flood from 
breaching dam); U.S. v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1953). 
And no compensation is required. For example, California 
recently acted to eradicate the medfly. In one case, the State's 
wide-scale chemical spraying ruined paint on cars insured by five 
insurance companies, who sued in inverse condemnation for the 
many claims they had to pay. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. State, 175 
Cal.App.3d 494, 221 Cal.Rptr. 225 (1985). In another case, a 
farmer claimed a taking when his crop rotted from the spraying. 
Teresi v. State, 180 Cal.App.3d 239, 225 Cal.Rptr. 517 (1986). 
In each case, the court recognized the emergency, upheld the 
police power action, and denied compensation on that basis. 
In Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), a case the 
Supreme Court regularly discusses with approval (see, e.g., Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1244 
(1987); Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
125-26 (1978)), the Court held the Takings Clause did not require 
Virginia to compensate the owners of cedar trees for the value of 
the trees when the State ordered them destroyed. The trees had 
to be destroyed to prevent a disease from spreading to nearby 
apple orchards, which represented a more valuable resource. 
In Miller v. Schoene, "the Court did not consider it neces-
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sary to 'weigh with nicety the question whether the infected 
cedars constitute a nuisance according to common law; or whether 
they may be so declared by statute.' Rather, it was clear that 
the State's exercise of its police power to prevent the impending 
danger was justified, and did not require compensation." Keys-
tone, supra, 107 S.Ct. at 1245, quoting Schoene, 276 U.S. at 280. 
Colman suggests he can overcome the "emergency" doctrine and 
demand compensation simply because his ditch was not a nuisance. 
That is not true, as just shown in the Keystone discussion of 
Schoene. Property may be affected by emergency action, without 
compensation, regardless of whether the property itself is a 
nuisance. The status of Colman's property has nothing to do with 
it. There was an emergency, the State met it with police power, 
and no taking occurred thereby. 
Colman also argues the "emergency" cases apply only if the 
plaintiff's property would have been destroyed by the emergency 
in any event. The foregoing cases refute Colman's argument.32 
The emergency (the disease) in Schoene, for example, apparently 
affected the apple trees but not the cedars. The State had to 
make "a choice between the preservation of one class of property 
[or] * * * the other," 276 U.S. at 279, and the State decided to 
destroy the cedars. 
In the California cases, obviously the medflies (the emer-
gency) would not have harmed the cars' paint, nor was it inevi-
table that medflies would have damaged the particular plaintiff's 
3 2
 It is evident, of course, that Colman's ditch already was 
in the emergency. Before the breach, as after, the ditch was 
under 10 feet of floodwater, and the Lake continued to rise. 
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crop specifically. In each case, police power was exercised 
against the emergency without compensation, and it was not a 
prerequisite that the plaintiff's property would have been 
destroyed by the emergency in any event.33 
In extraordinary floods, like that around the Lake in this 
case, the State (as well as any affected property owner) may 
treat floodwater as a common enemy, and may take any reasonable 
action, without liability to anyone who may be damaged by those 
defensive efforts. McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 6 Utah2d 92, 
305 P.2d 1097, 1100 (1957). 
The Utah Legislature recognized the emergency of the rising 
Lake. The Great Salt Lake Causeway Act (see Appendix of Colman's 
•*•* There are many examples of noncompensable emergency 
police-power action. E.g., in United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 
149 (1953), there was no taking when the army destroyed private 
property to prevent it from possibly falling into enemy hands. 
"The terse language of the Fifth Amendment is no comprehensive 
promise that the United States will make whole all who suffer 
from every ravage and burden of war. * * * [M]any losses must be 
attributed solely to the fortunes of war, and not to the 
sovereign." Id. at 155-56. 
In a case involving Mt. St. Helens, Cougar Business Owners 
Ass'n v. State, 97 Wash.2d 466, 647 P.2d 481 (1982) (en banc), 
the State imposed emergency restrictions on access to private 
property because of volcanic activity. The court held there was 
no taking, id. 647 P.2d at 486, and the restrictions did not 
deprive property rights without due process. Id. at 488. 
Also see Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York, 425 F.Supp. 97 0, 
977 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("In order to fulfill its primary obligation 
to protect the well-being of its citizens in times of emergency, 
a sovereign may take action which constitutes some taking of 
property without being required to pay compensation."); City of 
Rapid City v. Boland, 271 N.W.2d 60, 66 n.3 (S.D. 1978)(citing 
McKell, supra (Utah 1957)); Franco-Italian Packing Co. v. U.S., 
128 F.Supp. 408, 413 (Ct.Cl. 1955)(The Government's "regulatory 
and police powers, war powers or emergency powers in cases of 
imminent peril to the general welfare do not fall within the 
fifth amendment limitation, although taking of property often 
result[s]."); Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879). 
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original brief) expressly recognized that the Lake's "extraordi-
nary flooding conditions [were] resulting in substantial damage 
to public and private facilities." R. 373. The floodwater 
"pose[d] a threat to life, health, and property, and in par-
ticular may result in extensive damage to public lands, major 
transportation routes, and other public facilities." Id. The 
Legislature therefore ordered the breach.34 
Some may disagree with the Legislature's decision to breach 
the Causeway, but "debatable questions as to reasonableness are 
not for the courts but for the legislature." Cougar Business 
Owners Ass'n v. State, 647 P.2d 481, 487 (1982). 
Breaching was the best solution under the circumstances. It 
averted much worse flooding; the Lake continued to rise dramati-
cally even after the breach. Indeed, the breach was literally 
essential to the West Desert pumping project, which the Legisla-
ture later undertook against the continuing flooding.35 
3 4
 In his supplemental brief (at 49-50), Colman continues 
from his original brief his argument that the Causeway Act 
"implies" the State had some obligation to condemn Colman's 
property. We disagree. We refer the Court to the State's 
Primary Brief (at 10 n.5) for our response to Colmanfs argument. 
3 5
 One could not reasonably argue that, because it took 
several weeks to accomplish, breaching the Causeway did not 
constitute emergency action. The flooding (the emergency) was 
already occurring. The breach was the fastest available remedy, 
and it took some time. One should not judge whether there is an 
emergency by how much time is required to remedy it. If, for ex-
ample, an astronaut has trouble in space, he is in an emergency, 
regardless of how long it takes to rescue him. One cannot say 
his predicament is other than an emergency because his problem 
cannot be solved in a matter of hours, days or even weeks. 
Emergencies cannot be standardized. 
Also, if there could be any question about the existence of 
an emergency here, we respectfully submit that "the legislature's 
(continued...) 
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In breaching the Causeway, the Legislature and the executive 
branch did what government is supposed to do. They preserved 
"life, health, property and public peace11 and thereby discharged 
"a basic governmental policy.11 Cougar Business, supra, 647 P.2d 
at 484. 
Since the State reasonably exercised its police power in 
meeting this emergency, we need look no further. Colman cannot 
sustain a "taking" as a matter of law. We continue the analysis, 
however, for the benefit of other cases that might not involve an 
emergency. 
b. 
Flooding. The flood cases also deny Colmanfs "takings" 
claim. The U.S. Supreme Court "has consistently distinguished 
between flooding cases involving a permanent physical occupation, 
on the one h^nd, and cases involving a more temporary invasion, 
or government: action outside the owner's property that causes 
consequential damages within, on the other. A taking has always 
been found only in the former situation." Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982)(citing 
cases)(emphasis added). 
"[T]o be a taking, flooding must 'constitute an actual, 
permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of, 
and not merely an injury to, the property.1" Id,, quoting 
Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924). 
35(...continued) 
determination of an emergency in an act is a policy decision 
exclusively within the ambit of legislative authority, and the 
judiciary cannot second-guess that decision." Idaho State AFL-
CIO v. Leroy, 718 P.2d 1129, 1136 (Idaho 1986). 
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Loretto also explains that, in flooding cases, there is no 
"taking11 where governmental "obstruction only impair[s] the use 
of plaintiffs1 property." 458 U.S. at 428, citing Northern 
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879)(a tem-
porary dam in a river to permit construction of a tunnel was not 
a taking, even though the plaintiffs were thereby denied access 
to their premises. Significantly, "[n}o entry was made upon the 
plaintiffs' lot."). 
There is a taking in flooding situations only where govern-
ment permanently causes the property to be flooded. Loretto at 
427, citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 181 (1872). 
Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So.2d 859, 863 (Fla.App. 1962). 
Colman's ditch has not been permanently (or even temporari-
ly) occupied by the State. We maintain Colman's ditch was not 
impaired at all; but even assuming some damage, breaching the 
Causeway could at most be considered "government action outside 
the owner's property that cause[s] consequential damages within," 
which is not a "taking." Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428. 
As a matter of law, Colman cannot sustain his takings claim. 
The State has shown two independent reasons (emergency police 
power, and "takings" law relative to flooding) to affirm the 
lower court. (Of course, one reason would be enough.) We 
continue our analysis only to complete the discussion of the 
takings categories (for other cases that might not involve either 
an emergency or flooding). 
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c. 
Physical Interference, Invasion or Occupation. We emphasize 
that the emergency and flooding cases control this case. The 
remaining cases are useful only indirectly, to illuminate the 
field of eminent domain generally. 
For example, Loretto, supra, outlines the law for non-
flooding invasions of property. Loretto found a taking where, 
with governmental authority, the cable company's intrusion "in-
volved a direct physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, 
bolts, and screws to the [plaintiff's] building." Id., 458 U.S. 
at 438. 
The Court's holding, "that a permanent physical occupation 
of property is a taking," is, as the Court emphasized, "very 
narrow." Id. at 441. It should not be broadened or misused. 
Mere "physical intrusion" does not necessarily constitute a 
taking until it "reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical 
occupation." Id. at 426. That principle is clear also from 
Prunevard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In 
Pruneyard, state law required the shopping-center owner to permit 
the public to enter and use his property as a public forum. 
That, the Court held, was no taking of his property rights. As 
we therefore see, "the fact that [the public] may have 'physical-
ly invaded1 [the] property cannot be viewed as determinative." 
Id. at 84. 
In sum, an actual "permanent physical occupation" consti-
tutes a taking, but a lesser physical "invasion" usually does 
not. Of course, mere "interference" is even less able to be 
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characterized as a "taking" of property. 
This Court follows those basic principles. For example, in 
Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 
(1960), the plaintiff sued the State Road Commission for placing 
in the street a concrete island that impaired access to his pro-
perty. The Court found no compensable taking. "[I]f the sove-
reign exercises its police power reasonably and for the good of 
all the people, when constructing highways, consequential damages 
such as those alleged here, are not compensable." Id., 349 P.2d 
at 158. "Access has not been denied. Interfered with, it is 
true, but in our opinion to no unreasonable extent." Id. at 159 
(emphasis added). Mere "interference" generally is not a taking. 
As Springville aptly suggests, if the State had to compen-
sate every time someone alleged a "taking," there would be dire 
public consequences. "Highways would remain unmarked because of 
the prohibitive cost [of paying] damages * * *. Highways would 
become increasingly more dangerous." Id. Of course, each case 
is different, but each should be decided "with the general public 
good being the primary consideration." Id. 
In Holt v. State Road Comm'n, supra, the plaintiff alleged 
interference with property-access. The Court simply held 
"[t]here [was] no taking of property." 511 P.2d at 1287. 
In Bailey Service v. State, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975), the 
plaintiff sued when the State built a viaduct that obstructed 
access to his property by large (delivery) trucks. This inter-
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ference was no taking.36 
In Twenty-second Corp. v. Oregon Short Line R.R. , 3 6 Utah 
238, 103 Pac. 243 (1909), the plaintiff unsuccessfully claimed 
that noise so interfered with the use of its property as to 
constitute a taking. 
3 6
 Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), 
might seem to deviate from the rule that a taking requires more 
than mere interference with property. To the extent it deviates, 
it is probably errant. But Miya can be distinguished in any 
event. Miya was not an inverse condemnation case; the State was 
the formal condemnor. There was no doubt some "taking" had oc-
curred. The only question was the basis and amount of severance 
damages. 
The Court specifically noted that "even if it diminishes the 
value of abutting property," erection of the public highway could 
not constitute damage "in the constitutional sense" "[u]nless the 
structure violates some right appurtenant to the abutting proper-
ty or otherwise inflicts some special and peculiar injury." Only 
then would compensation be required. Id. at 929. The Court did 
allow severance damages for "impairment of light and air, * * * 
view, invasion of privacy, and deprivation of access"; but 
apparently did so on the basis of a statute expressly mentioning 
such rights. Id. Miya is inapposite here. 
We also respectfully submit that, considering this Court's 
precedents (discussed above) and the general rule, a recent case 
was incorrectly decided in a lower court. Three D Corp. v. Salt 
Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321 (Utah App. 1988), involved not a physi-
cal occupation or invasion, but at most an interference with 
public parking. Access, although now somewhat more limited, was 
still readily available. As one commentator has noted in criti-
cizing Three D, the court followed the wrong precedent. In 
requiring compensation, the court applied Miya, but "Bailey 
[supra] is the case most similar to Three D," and compensation 
should not have been allowed. 1989 Utah Law Review 143, 205. 
We agree with that comment, and find fault with Three D also 
on another ground. We think the plaintiff had no property right 
in public parking on the public right-of-way. The roadway is 
city property, and the city certainly can manage it to allow, 
disallow or limit parking thereon. The store owner may have a 
right to reasonable access (which he apparently had in fact), 
but no right to have the city guaranty public parking for his 
customers on public land. (In contrast, in Miya there was a 
property right because a statute specifically acknowledged it.) 
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Compensation for bothersome traffic noise (caused when the 
highway was widened by formal condemnation) was also disallowed 
in State Road Comm'n v. Williams, 22 Utah2d 331, 452 P.2d 881, 
882 (1969), because "such damage is not special, unique and 
peculiar to the property." (Any flood or sediment damage to 
Colmanfs "ditch" also could not be special, unique or peculiar, 
considering his ditch is located on the bed of a flooding lake.) 
None of the foregoing cases and principles helps Colman, 
The record shows Colmanfs "ditch" was not affected by the 
breach.37 And there obviously was no permanent physical occupa-
tion of the ditch by the State; nor did the State physically 
invade his ditch. As Pruneyard proves, even if the ditch were 
physically invaded, that alone could not "be viewed as deter-
mine ing]" a taking. 447 U.S. at 84. Colman has alleged at most 
an interference with his ditch, and he has stated no legal basis 
for a "taking." 
d. 
Regulation of Property. The regulatory cases (e.g., zoning 
cases, etc.) have no direct bearing on our case, because in 
breaching the Causeway the State was not regulating Colman in the 
use of his property. Those cases therefore lack direct preceden-
tial value here. They do, however, demonstrate significant 
principles in "takings" law generally, and therefore shine some 
light on Colman!s claim. 
3 7
 See R. 117-126. The State's expert testified that "the 
initial breach will have little, if any, adverse effect on 
[Colman1s] ditch, and after approximately 30 days the breach will 
have no adverse impact on the ditch at all." R. 124. 
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"Suffice it to say that government regulation—by defini-
tion—involves the adjustment of rights for the public good." 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979). We might say that by 
breaching the Causeway and managing floodwaters the State was 
adjusting rights for the public good. "Often this adjustment 
curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of 
private property. To require compensation in all such circum-
stances would effectively compel the government to regulate by 
purchase." Id. (emphasis in original). 
"'Government hardly could go on if to some extent values 
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for 
every such change in the general law.1" Id., quoting Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
When acting in matters of public health, safety and welfare, 
and especially in emergencies, the State should not be faced with 
the specter of having to compensate everyone (known or unknown, 
foreseeable or unforeseeable) who might claim to be adversely 
affected. As Andrus suggests, the State should not be compelled 
to meet emergencies "by purchase." 
Note also that "the denial of one traditional property right 
does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner 
possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of 
one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate 
must be viewed in its entirety." Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66. 
Colman alleges a taking of his "ditch." But the ditch 
itself has no value outside Colman's mineral extraction opera-
tion, which is made possible only by the State lease. Assuming a 
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physical destruction of the ditch, that loss would constitute a 
loss of only one "strand" of the otherwise-unaffected "bundle" of 
property rights Colman has in his brine-extraction operation. 
And the ditch represents a very slender "strand" indeed. When, 
as now, the ditch is in 10 feet of brines, there is no need for 
the ditch itself; Colman can pump directly from the Lake. In 
these conditions, the ditch has no substantial function or value. 
Assuming the ditch existed and had some utility, and were 
then damaged, Colman still has his lease and (except for his own 
lack of a water right) he could pump and process brines and 
otherwise carry on his business. Any reduction in value of 
Colman1s business because of damage to the ditch is not legally 
significant. Sometimes police power regulations "prevent the 
most profitable use of * * * property. [But] that is not dis-
positive. * * * [A] reduction in the value of property is not 
necessarily equated with a taking." Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66. 
"The interference with [Colman!s] property is, considered as 
a whole, insignificant relative to those in which the Supreme 
Court has found no taking." Petrolite Corp. v. E.P.A., 519 
F.Supp. 966, 972 (D.D.C. 1981). 
The Causeway breach was beneficial to society generally and 
to Colman personally (he doubtless uses 1-80, which the breach 
helped spare, to travel to his lakeside facility). And even if 
Colmanfs alleged damage were real, his was not the only burden 
borne in all the flooding. His burden, like others1, must be 
"borne to secure 'the advantage of living and doing business in a 
civilized community.1" Id. at 67, quoting Mahon, supra, at 422. 
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e. 
First English, We cannot discuss all the countless regula-
tory cases; and we need not, for they do not control this case. 
But we must rebut Colman's assertion that "under First English, 
Colman is entitled to compensation for the period that the ditch 
was rendered useless." Colmanfs Supp. Brief 38. He misapplies 
First English, supra, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987). 
What the Court expressly did not decide in First English is, 
to the instant case, more important than what was decided. The 
Court stated it had "no occasion to decide [1] whether the 
ordinance at issue actually denied appellant all use of its 
property or [2] whether the county might avoid the conclusion 
that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the 
denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's author-
ity to enact safety regulations." 107 S.Ct. at 2384-85 (footnote 
omitted). 
Thus, the Court did not rule there was an actual taking of 
property, and it specifically noted that the State's police power 
might preclude a compensable taking as a matter of law. Id. 
The Court decided only this issue: If a "taking" is estab-
lished, and the taking is only temporary, must the government 
compensate "for 'temporary1 regulatory takings." Id. at 2 3 85 
(emphasis added). The Court held yes. 
Contrary to Colman's assertion, First English obviously does 
not apply here. Even by his own allegations his ditch was not 
the object of a regulatory taking. And First English clearly 
did not expand the concept of what constitutes a "taking." Id. 
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at 2384-85. Indeed, First English represents additional evidence 
of the police powerfs vitality against takings claims. Id. 
Colman can demand compensation for a temporary taking only 
if, on the basis of the principles of eminent domain discussed 
above, he can prove a taking at all. To do that he must over-
come all of the law pertaining to emergencies, floods, and 
physical interference with property rights. That he cannot do. 
f. 
Torts Cannot be Stretched into "Takings". As a matter of 
law, Colman has not stated a "takings" claim against the State. 
If his claim could prevail, the police power would be diminished 
and the State would be less eager to exercise it in an emergency. 
In the long run, the public health, safety and welfare would 
suffer. 
There would also be other negative consequences. If a 
claim no stronger than Colman1s could prevail, so might others 
try. (We believe Colman has stated no viable claim of any sort. 
His claim is unreasonable, to say the least, considering he 
demands compensation because the State allegedly put water over a 
ditch located on the bed of the Great Salt Lake.) If he could 
stretch his unmeritorious tort claim38 into a successful takings 
claim, then almost any damage claim against the State could be 
transformed into a "taking." 
That is also why, in our view, there is considerable risk in 
giving broad or special meaning to the word "damaged" in Article 
3 8
 At most, Colman stated only a trespass claim when he 
alleged the Causeway breach would send a flow of water over his 
already-submerged ditch. 
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I, Section 22. The Constitution should not become "a font of 
tort law." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 
"Takings" jurisprudence already requires compensation for 
property "damaged" in the constitutional sense of a "taking."39 
And we submit that, to maintain the integrity of the Constitution 
as a constitution (rather than a font of tort law), the present 
meaning and application of "damaged" should not be broadened. 
4. No "Taking" As a Matter of Fact 
Because of sovereign immunity, the nonexistence of a protec 
table property right, and the lack of legal merit of Colman's 
claim, there is no reason to reach the question of whether the 
"ditch" was taken as a matter of fact. 
However, we refer the Court again to the record, including 
the uncontradicted facts relating to the existence or condition 
3 9
 Our point is simply that "takings" law already appropri-
ately covers property "damaged" for public use. Any expansion of 
that concept would be too much. 
A "taking" is legal shorthand for the conclusion that a 
governmental entity has exercised its eminent domain power and 
that just compensation is therefore required. A "taking" can 
occur, in some instances, from a physical occupation or seizure 
of property (a literal taking), Loretto v. Teleprompter, supra, 
and sometimes from governmental actions that may "damage" but not 
literally "take" property. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, supra. 
Obviously, though, not every damaging (in the literal sense) 
requires compensation under the Constitution (nor does every 
literal physical occupation, seizure or destruction of property). 
Miller v. Schoene; U.S. v. Caltex, supra. It would be unneces-
sary and unwise to give the word "damaged" special meaning 
separate from its legal equivalent, "taken." To emphasize "dam-
aged" would be to suggest it operates disjunctively from "tak-
ings" analysis (the law of eminent domain). It clearly cannot so 
operate, or else the Constitution would become an all-purpose 
basis for suit anytime anyone alleges the State somehow damaged 
property. Cf. Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200 Pac. 510 (Utah 
1921); Belmar Drive-In Theater v. Illinois, 34 111.2d 544, 216 
N.E.2d 788, 792 (1966). 
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of the ditch before the breach. The facts will not support 
Colman1s takings claim. 
C. 
THE STATE'S RIGHT TO CONTROL THE LAKE 
This Court has consistently recognized that the State must 
be free to manage and control the Great Salt Lake for the public 
good. Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 
27 Utah2d 256, 495 P.2d 31, cert, denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); 
Solar Salt Co. v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 555 P.2d 286 (Utah 
1976) ; also see Hardy Salt Co. v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 
501 F.2d 1156 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974). 
In the cited cases (the "Salt Cases"), the State did not 
violate the plaintiffs1 rights by refusing to breach the Causeway 
for their benefit. Here, the State violated none of Colmanfs 
rights by breaching the Causeway for public benefit. 
What this Court noted in Morton, supra, also applies to 
Colman: "[His] theory would contemplate * * * that the public, 
state-owned waters of Great Salt Lake could be used for no 
purpose whatever" if it somehow interfered with his use of the 
Lake. 495 P.2d at 33-34. 
The State must be free to take any reasonable action in the 
public good on its own Lake. Colman's claim would fetter the 
State, and would "affec[t] the public weal," id., and that should 
not be allowed. 
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D. 
SUMMARY OF LAW AND POLICY 
We have shown that as a matter of law and sound policy 
Colman cannot prevail. 
Perhaps our position may be summarized by the following 
disinterested observations about Utah's flood situation. 
"The reasons for state immunity in flood control activities 
are compelling. The onslaught of naturally caused floodwaters 
requires speedy action, often dictating abrupt remedial measures. 
The state should not be prevented from managing flood emergen-
cies as circumstances dictate." Comment, "The Only Way to Manage 
a Desert: Utah's Liability Immunity For Flood Control," 8 
Journal of Energy Law and Policy 95, 118 (1987). 
"Emergency management sometimes necessitates incidental 
property damage, and the state should not be distracted by 
threats of liability from making wise and proper decisions 
necessary for the public's safety." Id. 
"To suggest any state liability for flooding damage would be 
to suggest that the state insures that the waters of the state 
will never flood. State statutes, case law, common sense, and 
sound public policy do not put such an impossible burden on the 
state." Id. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's judgment should be affirmed. 
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